“Vincent, that’s stupid talk” – Sean Quinn rejecting suggestions that artificially low insurance premiums caused the problems at Quinn Insurance. Vincent Browne interviews Sean Quinn for Tonight with Vincent Browne, broadcast on TV3 in July 2012.
There is an unfolding financial scandal at Quinn Insurance that has been largely overlooked until recently, and this is a bit of an “Idiots Guide” to what has happened, what it means for the economy and what it means to you.
Yesterday in the High Court, the joint administrators for Quinn Insurance gave a report on their work and alongside the Central Bank of Ireland, provided an upper estimate of the cost of bailing out Quinn Insurance at €1.65bn although the more likely estimate is €1.1-1.3bn – though on the other hand, it was made clear that the €1.65bn “upper limit” might itself increase, and given our recent history with bailing out banks, we can’t be blamed for getting that sinking feeling in our stomachs that this cost may rise.
A potted history of Quinn Insurance. Sean Quinn senior’s early businesses have been well-documented, he started with the family quarry in the 1970s and grew an enormous empire that made real products, mostly for the construction industry. In 1996, Quinn Financial Services was founded and with that Sean Quinn entered the insurance market where his company was, in the usual Quinn fashion up to then, highly successful, turning in decent profits and grew to become Ireland’s second biggest insurer by 2008, and by 2008 the insurance business was generating half of Quinn’s total revenues. The Quinn family controlled the company. The UK operation was launched in 2000. In 2007 the company made a €76m profit. In October 2008, the Financial Regulator Patrick Neary fined Quinn Insurance and Sean Quinn senior personally a total of €3.45m for having inappropriately transferred funds from Quinn Insurance to another Sean Quinn company, Barlo – this remains a record fine in Ireland. And at the same time, Sean Quinn stood down as chairman, though he and his family retained control of the company. In 2008 the company posted a €125m loss. In 2009 the loss rose to €706m. In March 2010, the current Financial Regulator, Matthew Elderfield had Michael McAteer and Paul McCann from Grant Thornton appointed as joint administrators, citing as the reason for his action in the press release “the interests of the firm’s policyholders” Matthew Elderfield was reported to have said that “the strength” of Quinn Insurance had been overstated by €450m and for the first time, the prospect of an insurance levy on consumers was mooted. In 2010 the company lost €160m.
Why do we bail out insurance companies? The Government acts as a backstop guarantee to cover all insurance claims for risks in this State. And until the end of 2011, it acted as a backstop guarantee for insurance policies written by Irish insurance companies in other states – that’s why we are on the hook for the UK liabilities at Quinn (see below). Why does the Government guarantee the finances of some businesses like banks and insurance companies, but not others like shops and factories? Mostly because these businesses depend on consumer confidence, the confidence to place money on deposit with banks, the confidence to expect a payout on your claim at an insurance company. The Government has created a fund, called the Insurance Compensation Fund (ICF), under the Insurance Act 1964, the purpose of which is to protect policy holders in the event of their insurer becoming insolvent. It is an industry financed fund. However because the scheme is not pre-funded, the Government advances monies on the recommendation of the Central Bank in circumstances where insufficient funds have been generated by an industry levy to cover a large demand.
Is this normal, how do other countries deal with insurance losses? It is not unusual for the governments to backstop guarantee insurance companies. And if that capitalist superpower the USA can bail out insurance company, AIG, to the tune of USD 170bn, then you can bet that our model is not unique.
How did it get so bad? It’s not totally clear and there is not a single cause. Quinn Insurance seemingly invested its premiums and those investments have lost an almost incredible amount. There was a loss in 2010 of “€677.6m resulting from the writedown of certain non-core assets held by subsidiaries, understood to be a wind farm in Derrylin, Co. Fermanagh and a number of hotel properties”.In the High Court yesterday the administrators offered a breakdown of other losses as follows: “€300 million of the increased costs relates to adverse provisions for potential claims on liabilities in Ireland and the UK, while €152 million is to cover actual and possible write-downs of the value of the insurer’s assets” and €208m is for “poor claims handling and reserve practices and the insurer’s culture of suppressing estimated claims” and “€215 million cost arising from further declines in the value of the euro against sterling”
Who are the players? There’s Patrick Neary the former Financial Regulator who retired in January 2009 with that famous €650,000 payoff. There’s PricewaterhouseCoopers who were the auditors of Quinn Insurance. There’s a company you mightn’t have heard of before, Milliman which is a firm of actuaries whose job it is to estimate future losses/claims. There’s the current Financial Regulator Matthew Elderfield who came on board in January 2010 and who appointed administrators to Quinn Insurance in March 2010 . There’s Sean Quinn himself of course who stepped down as chairman of Quinn Insurance in 2008, and the senior management at Quinn Insurance in 2008 included directors Liam McCaffrey (pictured here, termination payment of €1.4m in April 2011), Kevin Lunney, Shane Morrisson, Richard Stafford, Colin Morgan, Sean Quinn junior, Brendan Moran and non-executive directors, James Quilgley, Patrick Mullarkey, Vincent Clancy, Tony McCusker
Who is to blame? The primary culprit for losses in any business is the owner, and until March 2010, Sean Quinn was, for all intents and purposes, the owner though he stepped down as chairman in 2008. But if the losses were only booked after 2010, how can we blame Sean Quinn? Remember, the insurance business works with you paying a premium upfront and then there being subsequent claims – if the company is well run, then the premiums received will exceed the subsequent claims, it’s not rocket science! But there can be a considerable lag between paying the premium and receiving the compo. So you might purchase car insurance in March 2008, have a crash in December 2008, but between assessments and negotiations, it might be 2011 when you get you pay-out. In addition to the business owner, we might have cause for grievance against the auditors, PwC and the actuaries, Milliman. And at the official level, we might wish to vent our unhappiness (again!) at the former Financial Regulator, Patrick Neary.
These billions being talked about, is this real money? Oh yes, the Government gave a loan of €280m to the ICF in 2011, and so far this year, has given an additional loan of €450m – that’s €730m to date, and it looks set to loan another €0.4-1bn. It is getting this money from the usual sources – taxation and borrowings from the Troika. The Government will be repaid these loans with “a commercial rate of interest”, courtesy of YOU!
What is this going to cost me? With the exception of life assurance, the 2% levy will apply to all other insurance policies from all insurers covering risks in Ireland, and that will include motor and home insurance. If the size of the non-life insurance market in Ireland is €4bn per annum, then to recoup €1.1bn with a 2% levy, implies we will be paying for 13.5 years at constant prices. If the final cost of the Quinn debacle is at the higher end estimate of €1.65bn, then we will be paying for 20 years at constant prices. Minister Noonan indicated in April 2012 that his forecasts were of a total annual levy of €65m which would indicate the Quinn misery lasts 17-28 years. Insurance premiums will rise of course – with inflation, if with nothing else, but unfortunately we also need pay “a commercial rate of interest” to the ICF which will offset the inflationary increase. The cost to you will be a 2% levy which is surcharged on your insurance premium so an €800 car insurance premium will cost you €816. A €500 Home and contents insurance premium will cost you €510.
Haven’t I been paying a levy all along? No, last year you will have paid a 3% stamp duty fee and that is different to the levy; the stamp duty fee goes directly to the Exchequer. This 2% levy that is now being talked about, is different, and extra. So now you’ll be paying an overall total of 5% to the Government on every non-life insurance policy, of which 2% is to pay for Quinn Insurance.
Where is the political oversight? Well the Irish finance minister up to May 2008 was Brian Cowen who later became Taoiseach and then disappeared from the national stage in January/February 2011 when Micheal Martin took over the reins. The late Brian Lenihan became finance minister in May 2008 and was at the helm when irregularities were uncovered and when administrators were appointed, and of course Michael Noonan has been at the helm since March 2011. There is little evidence of the “players” being called to account, though the administrators did launch legal action against PwC in February 2012 (High Court reference 2012/1540 P) but there has not been any development in that case yet. The Irish Times today reports “in June [2012], Noonan asked the administrators to keep him appraised on whether there is “right of legal action for professional negligence” against Quinn’s former auditors PricewaterhouseCoopers and the company’s “signing actuaries”, Milliman” But we have seen in recent Dail exchanges that Minister Noonan is not at all keen to cross swords with audit firms and others who seemingly played a major role in the 2008 crisis which has led to a €70bn bank bailout. Remember there used to be a company once called Arthur Andersen but it imploded in the aftermath of the Enron scandal. There doesn’t seem to be any official appetite in this country to test the professional indemnity insurance of auditors and others whose standard of work is suspected of contributing to the crisis.
Has this ever happened before? Oh yes, twice. Remember PMPA, the motor insurance provider founded in the 1960s by Joe Moore, which went bust in 1983 leaving us with a €10m – yes, a paltry ten million – bill. Then there was the AIB unit, the Insurance Corporation of Ireland which needed a bailout in 1985 and cost us just over €120m. If you were around, you will have been paying a 2% levy between 1984 and early 1990s to fund these two particular messes. But with a combined total cost of less than €150m, these two bailouts were peanuts compared with the mess today at Quinn.
Could it happen again? Yes. Unfortunately. Under normal circumstances you would expect a properly-run and regulated insurance company to have enough reserves to meet expected claims. But if we get unexpected disasters, like freak weather for example, then a future government may need bail-out another insurance company. That’s why insurance companies are subject to official regulation and what should be intrusive auditing and actuarial forecasting. In the case of Quinn, it seems that the investments made with the insurance premiums, performed very badly indeed and it is not clear how Quinn was allowed invest in what will have been less than blue-chip investments, or in related companies.
UPDATE: 8th August, 2012. Statement from Sean Quinn senior this afternoon ”
I welcome Minister Noonan’s comments that he is “at a loss to see how such a large underestimation, and the corresponding scale of what is required from the Insurance Compensation Fund (“ICF“), could not have been foreseen to a greater extent before now” and that Irish Government was “misled”.
“I have said all along that Quinn Insurance (the “Company” or “QIL“) was placed into Administration unnecessarily and on the basis of incorrect assumptions relied on by the Regulator, regarding the effects the Quinn Groups guarantees had on the solvency position of QIL.
These guarantees were in place since 2005, were signed off by Auditors and were historically viewed as having no effect whatsoever on the solvency position of the Company; this was the appropriate treatment of the guarantees and has since been verified by legal opinion.
The reality is that the Company was outperforming all its competitors immediately prior to being unnecessarily placed into Administration with the incalculable damage being inflicted thereafter.
Since 2008, the Company, under the newly appointed board as agreed with the Regulator, continued to perform remarkably well. Despite the recession, the first quarter of 2010 was one of, if not the best quarter, in QIL’s history. In this quarter the Company reduced its claims by more than 2,800 and increased its cash position by 20 million Euro, which left QIL with an average reserve of more than twice the industry average, not to forget the 2,500 jobs that the Company was sustaining.
The figures purportedly required by the Administrators from the ICF are truly shocking. The Court and Dept of Finance should seek further information on how they arrived at this astronomical figure, as even according to the Administrator’s own figures produced in March of this year; the Company had a loss ratio of 75.09% between 2004 and 2008, with only 2,593, claims remaining open for this period, therefore any suggestion that QIL was not profitable are completely unfounded. Furthermore, the Company has been settling circa. 95% of its claims within the first 12 months and a further 45% of the balance the year after, leaving only a small percentage of claims open after two years, so any suggestion that the previous management where underproviding for claims are groundless.
My biggest regret in all of this is not challenging the provisional appointment of the Administrators, however from the outset they actively discouraged us to do so under the guise that our best prospects of regaining control of the Company was by working through the issues with them. How naïve we were. The Administrators completely sidelined us and effectively set about destroying one of the most profitable Company’s in Irish corporate history; while blaming the previous management in the process. All this coming from the very people who openly admitted to the Irish Times on 25th February 2011 to knowing absolutely nothing about the Irish Insurance Industry prior to their appointment as Administrators
However, as is clear from Minister Noonan’s statement we were not the only ones ‘misled’.
I believe that history will ultimately demonstrate that the deal between Anglo Irish Bank and Liberty Mutual will be recognised as the worst possible outcome for the State. The Administrators should not have been appointed in the first instance, however even if this is disputed, the Quinn family’s proposal would have retained 100% of the Company for the benefit of the State at a fraction of the cost of the Liberty deal.”
@NWL
Whilst I normally applaud your analysis in this instance sadly your effort to explain the issues at hand is incorrect in many respects.
This biggest driver to actuarial forecasts of likely claims is the time spent in dealing with such claims because in allowing claims to go unmanaged simple claims can grow into monsters in a relatively short space of time. During Sean Quinn’s recent interview with Vincent Browne he indicated that the Administrators in allowing 400 claims staff redundancy terms he (the Administrator) then opened himself up for the likely possibility of claims not being properly managed and the result is exactly what your seeing today – claims which should have been dealt with in time were allowed to fester and grow exponentially. This could have been easily avoided had the Administrators listened. They didn’t.
In addition the Administrators it must be remembered took over the management of the business and part of that takeover involved managing the underlying investments supporting the claims. Blaming the management team as mentioned above is unfair – the team above left to do their roles would have managed this situation significantly better than the appointed Administrators who by their own admission knew next to nothing in running an insurance company.
Whilst it may not be well known the Administrators sought to cash in all bond and equity investments shortly after their arrival – since that decision was made bond returns particularly long dated French/German and UK Govt holdings have performed extraordinarily well and the natural hedging of long dated bond holdings against longer dated claims was lost in the process. What we now have is short-term cash holdings (all euro it seems) against long dated claims whose costs are rising hugely as a result of the Present Value of these claims rising as German long dated bund yields collapse to 200 year lows. This is an Administrators error nothing to do with management and as a result your crititism is well wide of the mark.
Equally it must also be remembered that the write down in asset values related to properties held in other related Group companies were incapable of ever being sold. They were part of the reason why the Administration happened in the first instance. In relation to these holdings managements hands were completely tied therefore your criticism is again unfair and unbalanced.
You note the following:
“€300 million of the increased costs relates to adverse provisions for potential claims on liabilities in Ireland and the UK, while €152 million is to cover actual and possible write-downs of the value of the insurer’s assets” and €208m is for “poor claims handling and reserve practices and the insurer’s culture of suppressing estimated claims” and “€215 million cost arising from further declines in the value of the euro against sterling”
A few points: the Administrators have been running this business for the best part of two and half years therefore trying to suggest that €208m additional costs arising due to poor claims handling and reserve practices just reiterates what I noted above, they didn’t know how to run the show. The currency hedging loss is again part of their mis handling of the underlying assets in running the business. The €300m is part of allowing claims not be dealt with in the correct manner and fashion that was previously the case and confirms Sean Quinn’s suspicions.
Sadly the Administrators in trying to blame everyone else aside from themselves is typical of over paid professionals in Ireland – they screw up and yet the normal Joe is passed the bill.
The media reporting and analysis of this debacle has been abysmal please don’t add any further salt to that wound.
@Yields or Bust,
There wil be a follow-up post with the transcript of the Vincent Browne interview as it touched on Quinn Direct.
You raise interesting points which, on the face of it, deserve further investigation.
I must say that I have difficulty imagining the administrators saying to Sean “on the first day, a Saturday”
“Lookit Sean, we don’t know anything about insurance” !
As claimed by Sean in the interview, which went by pretty quickly and I think a lot of the content will have generally gone over people’s heads. Hopefully a transcript will remedy that shortcoming, and it might even restore your confidence that this is not to rub salt in any wound, but to explain to people in manageable bites what is going on at Quinn.
Speaking to a guy recently who was the lead for professional indemnity in the UK for Zurich when Quinn entered the market. He was unaware of the current controversy in Ireland. He said it was astonishing the sh1te that Quinn underwrote, and that within a year they had successfully grabbed the worst 15% of the market. Trying to pin this on the administrators unwinding of long bond positions (imagine!) is insanity. These losses were caused by reckless mismanagement. Insurance is a 300 year old business – anyone who claims they have figured out a way to do it 15% cheaper than everyone else is a charlatan or a fool, and history is littered with similar examples
Even when this sorry mess is done and dusted, I can’t ever see the extra levies and charges being abolished.
Look at the health levy, people were asked by Ms Mary Harney would they be willing to pay a extra 1% to support the dept of Health, that was back in the 90’s I think.
This temporary levy was doubled and has since become permanent.
Citizens of Ireland will not be paying these extra levies until the Quinn episode is sorted out, they will be paying them forever.
@NWL / @Yield.
Failure to hedge known sterling liabilities- €215 million euros.
Failure to manage the claims ~300 million.
That is half a billion largely down to the Administrator.
An idiot would have retained sterling deposits to cover expected sterling liabilities.
Quite possible that the Quinn UK has become the receptacle for the total cost of every claim they have insured, regardless of liability.
It doesn’t matter that the Quinn insured party was not negligent, or only partially negligent, the word is probably out on the street.
The Paddy’s are there to be taken. Dump it on them.
Ireland needs to take a different approach with Quinn Insurance . Refuse to pay.
Its that simple.
There seems to be no known depths both to the amount of incompetence in Ireland and the ability of that incompetence to find its way to positions requiring competence.
@ JR,
“There seems to be no known depths both to the amount of incompetence in Ireland and the ability of that incompetence to find its way to positions requiring competence.”
+1
In Ireland Incompetence is rewarded. That’s why we get the same result every time.
They don’t have a clue how to run the business, and they, the administrators, admitted that from the get go and shortly after decided that they did not need all these staff working in claims making 400 of them redundant. Well I guess this learning on the job is going to be very, very expensive. Soon they will be on a hiring spree to try and close the stable door. If I was making a professional indemnity claim in the UK against the Quinn group (the Irish state) I would be pushing open doors. They know that this is just another one of those mad cap Irish chappies guarantees that the Irish are so fond of giving out. The way this company is now being run is a charter for absurd claims being made and who is going to beat them down in the extravagance? Where is the incentive to save the state money? Nowhere.
As for the 1% sure what is 1% when you compare it with what the late Brian Lenihan did. What will 1% be when the rest of the residential mortgage books slide silently beneath the waves even as the NAMA vendor finance is handed out like cake.
A few people have drawn attention to one our high court judges talking about “professionals feeding off the carcasses’ of firms”? I wonder who he possibly could have meant?
Sean Quinn is first round hall of fame,best brightest businessman of his generation.He was buying market share,with a loss loser.All these comments and so called experts don’t hold a candle to Sean nor could they lace his boots.All the best Sean and family,they know not what they do.
“Only he knows how to face the future hopefully
Surrounded by despair
He won’t ask for your pity or your sympathy
But surely you should care ”
Luke Kelly./Phil Coulter.
Oh well! Phil Coulter is being quoted! Case closed then.Q.E.D. The bard Coulter has a wisdom that echoes through the years! LOL!
I’ll thell you what,this whole debacle has just demosnstrated the two Ireland’s that exist. The 40% or so gombeen nation that votes FF through the decades and can’t see the truth staring them in the face.They clap the cute hoor in the back while he picks their pocket.
@Andrew its a big bad world out there,insurance companies by their nature fudge the numbers.Sean Quinn covered on a weekly basis,a larger payroll then you ever will or can imagine aspiring too.He is getting persecuted by the Irish elite,to cover their own ass.Keep wearing the blinkers.He is a great businessman,father and leader in his community.All the best Sean and family.
Who are these ‘elite’?They all live in D4 I suppose?
Look I won’t turn this in to the Independent of p.ie. This blog s better than that.
You take care John.
@ JohnG
Size of the payroll only counts if the enterprise is soundly based. There is such a thing as malinvestment, and gambling for resurrection usually fails. Buying market share requires deeper pockets than Sean had, so he has gone to Boot Hill. Its’ a tragedy for lots of folk, but such is life.
Insurers write business to make profits in two ways. The first being to generate an underwriting profit and the second way is to use the premia to invest for a profit until you have to pay out on claims. It is for the second of these that insurance companies are beloved by Warren Buffet. Interest free money well invested can generate a lot of profit.
The emphasis on these two profit centres shifts all the time depending on the investment market. Lloyd’s regularly underwrites at a loss in order to obtain funds to invest in lucrative bond returns.
Quinn was no different. He lowered his rates to get the premia in (i.e. he bought the insurance market) and hoped to make his profit on his investment ability. Obviously, the Administrators couldn’t cut it as investors, not that Sean Quinn had shown any skills in that area either in the recent past – but I’d put my money on him rather than a bunch of accountants acting as the next best thing to receivers. They are only capable of running the business off in a very expensive fashion.
Parallel to all of this is the necessity to mitigate and settle claims quickly and below the budgeted provision levels. This can be done in-house, by reinsurance, commutations or by selling the claims to specialist third party run-off companies. The Administrators appear to have no expertise in this area at all. It can’t all be blamed on Sean Quinn. The auditors signed off on loss levels. At some point, like elected politicians after two years, those in control have to take responsibility (and the consequences) for their actions
@wstt
as far as I know warren buffet has stated that the party is over for the insurance industry, Also a third way( slightly different from before) involves cloud computing and a billion stupid little insurance policies some of which we already discussed here and a million more even stupider ones.
As for “blame” here’s another great Americanism…”for things to be this bad, someone had to take their hands off the wheel a long long time ago..”
I doubt any one man could make such a mess alone.
Quinn’s “success” couldn’t have been achieved without an army of people around him – below him in his companies & above him at Governance/Regulator levels.
Equally, his unquestionable failures couldn’t have been achieved without the same army of people.
I’m forever amazed by people’s selective blind spot when it comes to success & failure. Success is always individual while failure is always collective – Sean Quinn was a genius and succeeded on his own, but when his luck ran out it was a bunch of other people’s fault.
The underwriting cycle in the property-liability insurance business is a recurring pattern of increases and decreases in insurance prices and profits since Edward Lloyd opened his coffee house in Tower Street in 1687. Right now the industry is suffering one of those cyclical downturns. See graph:
Buffet’s fortune is founded in the insurance business. Sean Quinn knew enough to copy the model. He got it wrong by using the premia to invest in CFDs based on Anglo shares. It was a huge bet that lost. Simple as that. The losses since are due to bad underwriting and even worse claims management – that’s down to the the current Administrators (IMO).
@WSTT, Quinn Insurance may well turn into a blame game with the administrators blaming Sean Quinn and the previous management and vice versa. But the fact stands that to date the biggest loss was in 2009 on the write-down of investments, and in 2009, although Sean Quinn had stood down as chairman in 2008, he was still for all intents and purposes in charge until March 2010 when administrators were appointed and the de-Quinning started.
As regards the core insurance business and the management of claims, on one hand you have the current regime which will presumably seek to paint the picture of the previous regime writing loss-making insurance policies which are now coming home to roost with excessive claims. The previous regime seems to be claiming that it is the management of these claims now by the current regime that is causing the losses. Who will referee this one? Remember the previous regime have audited accounts and actuarial valuations to support their claims, so you can’t just wave them away…
But regardless of the current blame game, it does seem that nearly half of the losses occurred during Sean Quinn’s control of the company, and although the other half may be materialising now, the jury is out on the cause.
It is hard to imagine the CFD option as anything other than a desperate last resort on the part of SQ. His increasingly leveraged and diversified business model was undoubtedly coming unstuck, and the whole group was hanging on the QI cashflow.
Making QI a semi-state was a bit like taking a troubled kid into institutional care.
There is scope for a whole new range of abuses, particularly of the principal agent variety. As those responsible have a blank cheque, with little external oversight, it is in their objective interest, and that of their various associates, that it should contain the greatest possible number of zeroes. It will be a while before another such goose comes along.
The MoF and the High Court are naturally making faces, but they know the realpolitik better than anyonre.
The govt doesn’t cover all insurance cover, the ICF only covers non life (excludes life and reinsurance treaties) but until recently this included policies written in other states by firms headquartered here. The points made on hedging by yields or bust are interesting, but QIL not having an appointed actuary should have raised a large red flag at the regulator. Its the banking equivalent of outsourcing credit risk and financial management to consultants and auditors and we know how that worked out…
I think the following quote is interesting from Liberty Insurance chief executive Patrick O’Brien taken from the following Irish Times article:
http://m.irishtimes.com/newspaper/finance/2012/0224/1224312304118.html
One of O’Brien’s first decisions was to hire an actuary, a new function for Quinn Insurance. Isn’t it strange that the company never had such a role before?
“To me it seems a little bit strange,” O’Brien says. “You have to bring a technical approach towards insurance. At Liberty, that’s what we do. I guess the culture within Quinn Insurance pre-administration was different. It was coming out of a manufacturing-type background and maybe they didn’t appreciate the value that an actuary can bring to the process.”
“a fella that can do sums and quantify risk… sur’ why would we want wan of them around here tellin us what to do”. QI, Anglo, INBS, AIB, BoI, the central bank, Defpa,(+ a few others down in the ifsc who got wind of the lax nature of things), the list goes on….
Taxpayer stiffed yet again. We need a constitutional prohibition on the government taking on private liabilities except where approved by two thirds of Dail members. NOW.
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