It is interesting in this crisis how public perception has been shaped towards the banks. Sean Fitzpatrick, former chairman at Anglo (recipient of €29bn bailout) is cast as a pantomime villain whilst Eugene Sheehy, the former CEO of AIB (recipient of €20bn bailout) has escaped relatively scot-free. Similarly Michael Fingleton at Irish Nationwide (recipient of €5bn bailout) is constantly prodded in the media but you never hear a dickey bird about Denis Casey at Irish Life and Permanent (recipient of €4bn bailout). In fact, these were the 12 CEOs and chairpersons at the six state-guaranteed banks in September 2008 – Eugene Sheehy, David Drumm, Brian Goggins, Fergus Murphy, Michael Fingleton, Denis Casey, Dermot Gleeson, Sean Fitzpatrick, Richard Burrows, Mark Moran, Michael Walsh and Gillian Bowler. How many would you recognize? You can check your answers below!
Permanent TSB has received a €4bn bailout from us, and although that bank rejects the suggestion it will need additional funds from us, it is also a fact that it is pushing out the date by which it expects to be profitable again – in August 2011, it told the European Commission it would be returning to profit in 2014, a year later in August 2012, it was reported to have said it would return to profit “at the end of 2014 or start of 2015” and last week, it said it would return to profit in 2016; the pattern of ever-deepening bad news from PTSB is clear. We may get some of that money back because as part of the bailout, we have taken full control of Irish Life and that might be worth over €1bn if we ever sell it.
Tomorrow though, PTSB is repaying €1.3bn to bondholders. Unlike Anglo which is a designated zombie, it seems that PTSB has become a designated “pillar bank”, though it was not announced as such in March 2011 when the other two pillar banks, AIB and Bank of Ireland, were announced. And the bond being repaid tomorrow is one that was guaranteed by the Government when it was issued in January 2010, unlike many of the unguaranteed bonds repaid so far. However, this bond is NOT sovereign debt and is being paid from a bank that is 99.2% owned by us, which has an uncertain future and which has to date cost us €4bn.
The bond payment tomorrow should not go unnoticed.
When: Tomorrow, 14th January, 2013
What: Government guaranteed bond at Permanent TSB originally issued on 14th January 2010
Where: A bit of a vague answer but a payment will be made by PTSB to bond clearing companies who will then divvy the payment out to the bondholders. PTSB’s headquarters are at 56-59 St Stephen’s Green, Dublin.
How much: USD 1.75bn, that’s €1.311bn at the current exchange rate of EUR 1=USD1.3343
Why: Because the previous government guaranteed the bonds when they were issued in January 2010. But even if they had not been guaranteed, it is the policy of this government to repay senior bonds 100% unless the ECB changes its position and allows partial or full default, something that appears unlikely.
You will find details of all bonds payable in Irish banks at the Bondwatch website which is operated by Diarmuid O’Flynn who is active with the Ballyhea and Charleville bank bailout protests.
And as for recognizing the chairpersons and CEOs of the banks in September 2008, how did you do. This is the gallery.
NAMA Wine Lake 
I have, like all rational citizens, ferocious anger at tax money being used to fund unguaranteed bondholders, but this is a very different matter.
A government guaranteed bond issued in 2010 has to be honoured by the state. To argue otherwise is akin to the Republicans in the US campaigning against raising the debt ceiling.
Your point about it being a non-pillar bank is irrelevant. Once the state guaranteed the issue it has to stand over it. I’ll save my indignation—righteous or otherwise—for the next unsecured/pre-2009 bondholder to be paid-off.
What kind of attitude is that? I don’t support my money going to reckless bankers, but if it’s done through the intermediary of a reckless government then it’s OK? This is the thinking that has enabled the blackmail bailouts.
Only as long as it is able to do so. If not, then the State must default like any other insolvent debtor.
I got nine. I’m ashamed to say that I would have passed Moran, Walsh and Murphy on the street without scowling at them. I think most people would recognise as many of these bankers as major crime figures in the Dublin criminal gangs — the public I mean, well never mind.
The reality is that the rogue’s gallery of the banking crisis has a great deal more than 12 faces. The greed, corruption, incompetence, dishonesty, and yes “criminality”, was systemic. Utterly systemic.
Assume ~40,000 total employees in the banks concerned in 2004. Let’s conservatively estimate that about 20% of these went “darkside”–knowingly or not decided to break the bank(and state) in order to enrich themselves–which gives about 8,000 people. Let’s further assume that only 1% of these were in decision making roles; that’s 80 people in total who should be made accountable for what happened.
Personally, I estimate the “darkside” and decision making factors to be closer to 50% and 5% respectively, leading to 1,000 people who should be in the dock — and that’s just decision makers in the banks. If you really wanted to go full Draco and make everyone in the country own up to their offences during the boom — bankers, builders, lawyers, professionals, politicians, etc — I reckon you’d have to jail the guts of 10,000 people. That’s of the order of the number of prisoners incarcerated in the state already. In other words, it’s never going to happen(Now that the DSA’s are here).
That’s why people did it; why they “went mad” and enriched themselves at the expense of the rest of us. They knew, in some animal way, that the rogues gallery had or would become simply too large for society to grasp. They could profit now safe in the knowledge of never being held to account because “all the other children were doing it”. This was the essence of the Nyberg Report.
Personally, I also by now recognise that the law will never be able to deal with these people. The only way of dealing with them is simply not to pay. Do not bail them out, do not reward their failure, do not pick up the pieces of the banks they have smashed into the ground.
This bond should not be paid, Permanent TSB should be allowed to fail, gracefully or no. As should every other Irish bank. Creditors and bondholders should be told to take a hike, depositors should be shunted into some new vehicle and society must move on.
This is the only way our society can send a message and finally sort out the disaster these people have created. The only way. Anything less will mean three decades of decline, and god only knows what those above the law will have done to our democracy by then.
OMF
+1
All the banks employees and directors involved in any property lending decision since about 2001/02 when deals were going through at net rental yields less than the equivalent risk free rate as proxied by the 10 year German Bund, have blood on their hands. There is no escaping this reality.
Sadly many billions found its way into such deals and the finger of suspicion can only point one way and that’s at the direction of the directors, the lending officers and those in the bank that knew or ought to have known better. I appreciate that jailing people for stupidity is a non stater but where the line of demarcation between stupidity and recklessness starts and ends surely can be deemed to be where the broader markets define the well worn ‘risk free’. rate. Lending into risky property deals where returns were virtually guaranteed to be less than that rate could never be justified as ‘sound’ or ‘prudent’ or ‘clever’ or anything approaching any of the above.
Whilst we may have had to endure a period of economic mayhem had these institutions been allowed to fail I cannot for the life of me understand why such a hair brain decision made in Sept 2008 on the back of utterly false information can be allowed to dictate the economic lives of this and the next generation. The period of economic mayhem would have been short, sharp and painful but it would likely now be a distant memory. The ongoing ‘solution’ is begining to feel terribly like the ‘final’ one.
My reaction to this is a bit of “so what?”. As identified in the comments above the problems in the banks have little to do with bonds and bondholders – the problems in the Irish banks are because they lent out billions to people who could never repay them. That is where the ire should be directed.
If PTSB didn’t have this bond it would still have required a €4 billion recapitalisation under the 2011 PCAR. A quick read of The Financial Measures Programme Report will show how much of the bank recapitalisation was due to issuing bonds. (Ans: none).
Of course, some of the recapitalisation could have come from haircuts to bondholders, but once the bank has been recapitalised the amount of bonds to be repaid is irrelevant. The bank will pay the bond from increased deposits, newly issued bonds, central bank liquidity or other resources. PTSB has clearly indicated that the bond in question will be paid from these sources.
What volume government guarantee deposits have been repaid by PTSB since January 2010? Why get so excited about bonds when deposits are really no different. Depositors put money into a bank on one date with the expectation that they will take it out on a subsequent date, earning interest in the interim. Why are senior bonds any different? Apart from the increased risk of having to wait until maturity for the bank to repay the money. A multiple of deposits will have been withdrawn from the banks since January 2010.
The €4 billion recapitalisation of PTSB has given the State:
– 100% equity holding in Irish Life
– €0.4 billion of contingent convertible capital notes in PTSB
– 99.2% equity shareholding in PTSB
After the repayment of this bond the State will still own the above. There will have been no reduction in the State’s holding in PTSB because of the bond redemption. Banks don’t (in fact can’t) use capital to repay bonds.
The State paid €1.3 billion for the first item above and is looking to achieve at least that in a subsequent sale. Last week the State sold its CoCo notes in BOI for a very small premium to par. Could something similar happen for the PTSB portion? How much is the equity holding in PTSB worth? Might it be worth more than €2.3 billion at some stage? Maybe.
Anyway, whether or not this bond existed PTSB would have required a €4 billion recapitalisation following the 2011 PCAR so in the context of what has happened it is hard to see the significance of the bond redemption. The amount of money the State can get back from the PTSB bailout is unchanged by this redemption.
@Seamus,
(1) What is our stake in PTSB and Irish Life worth?
If you accept what Ray MacSharry told the Oireachtas just before Christmas, its capital will fall from 18% to 6% if house prices fall 60% from peak
“Mr. Ray MacSharry: If house prices drop by 59% or 60% that capital adequacy ratio could drop to 6%, which is a real stress case. To return to loan to deposits, which the Deputy mentioned, in 2009 our loan-to-deposits ratio was 265%. It went to 273% then it reduced in 2011 to 234% and it now stands at 192%.”
PTSB has two very big problems – a loss making and impaired Irish tracker mortgage loan book and a loss making English loan book. Despite recent evidence of a slowing in mortgage arrears, accounts in arrears >90 days are still increasing by 5,000 per quarter. The Troika appears alarmed by the €3m writeoff limit in the Personal Insolvency Act, unemployment outlook looks shaky and the interest rate outlook in the UK and EU seems stable at historically low rates. There’s a nasty subordinated bondholder appeal set for March 2013 in the UK, and if Anglo fails in its appeal, it opens the door for other bondholders in all covered banks who have endured haircuts to try their hand. PTSB has consistently lengthened the horizon over which it says it will return to profit. Irish Life meanwhile may be worth more than €1bn – as a standalone company, it’s a different kettle of fish to PTSB altogether and has far better prospects – though there is a legal case ongoing by former shareholders to stop any sale. Min Noonan has refused to answer questions on any current valuation of PTSB.
So, what are the stakes worth? And will PTSB need yet more capital? PTSB says no, but PTSB’s position has deteriorated before.
(2) “So what” about the payment of yesterday’s guaranteed bond. When the bond was issued in January 2010, we weren’t in an IMF programme and we were talking of 3% GDP growth in 2013. If the bond hadn’t been paid and a liability was written off in PTSB’s accounts then capital would have increased by €1.3bn or at least the profit and loss reserve would have increased which is ultimately distributable to holders of ordinary capital.
Are bondholders different to retail depositors? In a covered bank with guarantees, no. But what if those guarantees were withdrawn so that we went back to the old position of €100,000 guarantees for depositors and no guarantee for bondholders.
Ultimately, the bond was almost certainly going to be paid yesterday, but “so what” – at the very least, our “negotiators” in the debt deal talks should be pointing out the sacrifice to our partners.
@ NWL
(1) I see the McSharry quote but I’m not sure I see what he’s getting at. The loan losses on mortgages will primarily be determined by the number of defaults rather than house prices. If 1 in 25 of PTSB customers default then it won’t make a huge different whether house prices have fallen by 50% or 60%.
That would be around 4,000 houses defaulted on. The drop to 60% would be roughly another €30,000, give or take. The loss difference between a 50% drop in house prices and a 60% drop is €120 million.
The latest Interim Results from PTSB show that it had €3,454 million of available capital on 30/06/2012. €120 million is 3.5% of that and with €16,087 million of risk weighted assets such a loss would reduce the total capital ratio by just 0.7 of a percentage point. PTSB has a lot of problems but a 60% drop in house prices is not a significant one.
The point about “loss making trackers” is also debatable. The problem is really that there are not big enough profit makers rather than loss makers. The Banking Ireland component of PTSB had a net interest income of plus €182 million in the first six months of 2012. This is greater than the bank’s operating expenses of €136 million.
The bank reported a six-monthly loss of €588 million but that was determined by €434 million of provisions, €81 million of ELG fees, negative net interest income from its Banking UK arm of €16 million and €130 million of ‘exceptional items’ such as restructuring costs and provision on assets available for sale.
It is impossible to know when PTSB will return to profitability. It is hindered by very low margins on its tracker mortgage book but the losses will be determined elsewhere (mainly by provisions). What is PTSB worth? Impossible to say. In the current uncertain climate (growing arrears, impact of PIA etc.) placing a value on it is difficult.
These will erode the current 18% CT1 ratio in the bank but it is very much a guess to say how much? If the CT1 rate dropped to 6% as suggested by McSharry that would leave around €1 billion of capital in the bank (most of which would be shareholder equity). So €1 billion seems like a good place to start but it’s only a ballpark figure.
The sale of Irish Life is hoped to raise €1.3 billion and there is also the €0.4 billion of contingent convertible capital notes. That gives a total of €2.7 billion.
(2) You seem to assume that it would be possible to just haircut the senior guaranteed bond by 100%. The time for this action was when the bank needed recapitalisation. A bank with an 18% CT1 ratio cannot credibly commit to burning senior bondholders. The senior bonds could have been hit back in 2011. This could have resulted in a haircut (though nothing approaching 100%) or a debt-for-equity swap.
This would have meant the State putting less than €4 billion in but would also result in an ordinary shareholding of less than 99.2%. The impact this would have had will depend on the assumptions made but any saving will only be a portion of the €1.3 billion paid out on this bond. Maybe we would have put €3.5 billion into something now worth €2.4 billion.
Maybe, in a distant land of make believe PTSB returns to making profits of €250 million a year and has a market cap of €5 billion. Fairy tale stuff.
Finally, did the value of the State’s holdings in PTSB change between Friday and today as a result of the bond redemption yesterday? That is a useful question. If yes, then “how?” and if no, then we have “so what”.
@Seamus, I am not totally sure about Ray MacSharry’s statement either, but there is a bit of mystery at present regarding PTSB’s funding, and it is understood that it has entered into recent arrangements with “private banks” to provide funding which is secured on its mortgage assets. Now in valuing the mortgage assets, property values are relevant because if there is default, that’s what the lender has recourse to. PTSB is setting up an asset management unit, and it may be that these loans will be valued at market value in that venture as loans were when acquired by NAMA, and if so there will be losses which will eat into capital. Not sure.
I would take issue with you about the tracker mortgages being loss-making. At 0.75% (ECB) and 0.5% (Bank of England), the trackers are typically paying around 2% compared to PTSB’s total cost of funding which is likely to be 4-6%. Without looking more closely at it, I would assume PTSB uses some Effective Interest Rate which makes assumptions about future cashflows like NAMA, so would take the interest shown in the accounts with pinch of salt.
“Finally, did the value of the State’s holdings in PTSB change between Friday and today as a result of the bond redemption yesterday? That is a useful question. If yes, then “how?” and if no, then we have “so what”.”
Why don’t you flip the question and ask if the value of the State’s holdings in PTSB would have increased if the bond wasn’t paid. Again, very very difficult at this stage to not pay a guaranteed bond in a pillar bank, but at the very least, we should be making our opposites in the negotiations aware of the sacrifice.
@ NWL,
I agree the tracker mortgages are a problem, I’m just not sure how grave it is. All the banks have tracker mortgages but the emphasis seems to be on PTSB. They need to do additional lending to reduce the size of the tracker book relative to their entire lending portfolio. Announcing €450 million of new consuming lending is a very small step in that direction (assuming it is delivered on).
That’s an interesting juxtaposition on a question about something that did happen with a question about something that couldn’t happen. The €1.3 billion bond was paid yesterday. What did it cost in terms of the value of the State’s holding in PTSB? The bond was paid, and the value of the State’s holding (whatever that might be) is unchanged.
If PTSB hadn’t issued this bond in January 2010 (under the protection of the ELG) but instead had drawn down the funding from the ECB what difference would it have made to the €4 billion we put in following the March 2011 PCAR?
Do we lose money everything the bank repays a deposit? How come there are no “Depositor Protests” going on out there? Large institutional and inter-bank depositors were the biggest beneficiaries of the guarantee.
Banks don’t lose money by repaying deposits and bonds. PTSB didn’t lose money by repaying this bond. Banks lose money by lending it out to people who can’t pay it back and they did that by the billion-ful.
@Seamus the proposed sale to the Canadian’s has had more false starts that opposing NFL teams at the Seahawks Stadium-current NFL record.
Just this week there was news of further litigation…Canadians tend to be a bit ‘shy’ regarding ongoing litigation and contingent liabilities-is the rearranging of the deckchairs saga/litigation over yet ?
Major deterrent to any buyer-will the ‘seller’ here perhaps have to provide some indemnification to the buyers…at what price….
Regarding the CoCo’s just got a mark from b of i sale…par here…really!
Oh as an aside having serious technical ahem difficulties in posting on your tread at irisheconomy.ie,that you moderate,in case there is any further interest sourced and posted the actual CoCo here.
If i owe you or any other poster an apology,my sincere apologies if i was insulting/abusive/rude or otherwise obnoxious….would not be first time…
All the best,not fair to take this ‘fight’ over to the excellent NWL.
Thank you for indulging my postings,for as long as you did your thread your prerogative no explanation required/requested.
Not first nor last place that I have been 86ed,all best.
You may be familiar with Sayre’s Law if not provided a link….
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sayre's_law
@ John,
Your “technical difficulties” have nothing to do with me. I’m not sure what the moderation policy is on there but I don’t see any need for an apology.
@Seamus actually no tech. difficulties at all,here is the comment policy as outlined at “irisheconomy”…that would be you then !
“All comments are sent via email to the original contributor of the post and they have the option of deleting it at that point.”
I take it then that the actual ownership papers of the CoCo,that noticeably you failed to provide at irisheconomy.ie in hosting and moderating the exchange are of no value in the debate…very curios indeed.
“And thanks for contributing. Your contributions and the debates that they provoke make the site for more informative than it would be if it were comment-free and, of course, more fun.”
http://www.irisheconomy.ie/index.php/about/
@ John
I assume someone else has the same option as well but I don’t know if they exercised it.
Breaking news…CoCo the clown has been found,is home safe.Some kindly visiting Americans took,poor old beleaguered CoCo,with a humongous yield,off to retirement…..
Spent all day Monday attempting to link/post the ownership papers on the irisheconomy blog…alas was unsuccessful.
Go home I was told…I am home in NY a lot closer to CoCo than the citizens of Ireland….
@John, have you evidence of who bought the €1bn of CoCos last week?
“A source said that the bank’s key stakeholders could be buyers of the CoCo – which will offer a greater return than the stock”
http://corporatebanking.bankofireland.com/markets/market-news/IrishNews/item/33500/govt-sell-e1bn-of-bank-of-ireland-bonds/
@John, hilarious, that’s a press release from Bank of Ireland, citing “sources” left right and centre who are presumably Bank of Ireland employees!
@NWL, The proverbial “dogs in the street” in Wilbur Ross’s home town say that he bought it.
@WSTT, Wilbur already controls 9% of the ordinary shares. If the €1bn were converted to ordinary shares and if it were confirmed that Wilbur has bought all of the CoCos, then that would give Wilbur less than but close to 50% of Bank of Ireland.Talk about a 2-way bet (if it is confirmed that Wilbur bought the CoCos of course)
@John, there was an early announcement about existing investors agreeing to take half, but if it was an open book, then presumably it will have been the highest bidders at the end of the day that walked away with the CoCos.
Not sure how the winners of this beauty pageant were selected,perhaps the Minister will issues a statement…….after all its a bit “weird” to sell a ONE BILLION state asset in the dark of the night to persons “unknown” ….
First anyone heard of it it was a fait accompli,the press release and “reporting” are cover your ass documents….what if the CoCo has to be converted,nice for the Irish citizens to know who their future potential partners are don’t you think….it is after all a pillar bank.
It’s not just any old bond…the owners could have a significant say in the direction of the bank and Ireland’s economic future,if converted.
@John, and for conspiracy theorists, Michael Torpey, the head of the Shareholding Management Unit at the Department of Finance – that’s the “unit” which manages the State’s stakes in the banks including the CoCos and preference shares – has been poached to a plum position at Bank of Ireland – chief executive of its corporate and treasury division.
Michael would probably have been the Dept of Finance official closest to the disposal of the €1bn of CoCos. Nothing wrong in that as it’s part of the job of the Shareholding Management Unit, but his departure to a very senior post at Bank of Ireland looks, as they would say in the East End of London, “a little previous”
The Irish Times – “the paper of record” reports that Michael is “ex-NAMA” but he isn’t.
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/breaking/2013/0116/breaking55.html
@NWL also this piece…looks like CoCo the clown has emigrated to me:)
“Bank of Ireland announced on Wednesday morning that private investors, including some existing stockholders, had agreed to take at least half the 1 billion euros of the CoCos the state has held since a sector-wide recapitalisation in 2011.”
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/09/bankofireland-placement-idUSL5E9C92LQ20130109
@NWL in fairness to above IT reporter,that may have been the editor..the reporter did say NTMA in the article,but yes ‘tin foil hat’ time…this was the ‘process’ not sure if highest bidder wins here.. notwithstanding errors in the IT report,the timing is a little troubling.But on the other hand a massive huge vote of confidence,from a ‘insider’ privy to loads of confi. info. I doubt he threw himself in front of an on coming train crash career wise.
What a lovely confusing meaningless euphemism….a what “public investor book build exercise “..so did the highest bidder get them then..eh no actually that’s not how it works,its complicated!
“The Minister for Finance, Michael Noonan T.D., today welcomed the successful conclusion of negotiations which will see the Government dispose of a minimum of €500 million of its €1 billion holding of Contingent Capital Notes (CCN’s) in Bank of Ireland. The exact quantum and price at which this disposal will be conducted will depend on the outcome of a public investor book build exercise to be conducted by a consortium of banks.”
http://www.finance.gov.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=7505
Reviewing the actual OM on the CoCo bond focusing specifically on sale/transfer provisions,comments/review a little later on the other tread.
@Seamus…..
‘I assume someone else has the same option as well but I don’t know if they exercised it.’
Most importantly the OM or Prospectus for the B of I CoCo,is now in the public domain courtesy of NWL and not your thread at the irisheconomy.
We have a pretty decent ‘tech’ chap working here,no issues/problems our end..I was ‘blocked’ from posting on your tread..why i have no idea.Emailed myself the ‘post’ below.Attempted numerous times Monday and Tuesday to post it but….
Unfortunate turn of events as it was a very interesting tread and somewhat informative if admittedly I was a bit combative/obnoxious….but welcome to the yank ‘style’,I’m a pussycat in comparison to some the vulture funds/hedge funds fellows,asset stripping Ireland.
As I’m blocked perhaps if you get a chance you could be so kind as to post the OM/Prospectus as an update,thank you and again all the best was a great tread shame it ended the way it did.
The missing/deleted/blocked ‘tech challenged’ post from Seamus’s tread over at irisheconomy-copied it and emailed it to myself on Monday/Tuesday.
“@DOD that’s great news,whats with scaring the elderly like that…
@Edward you comp. with KW and apartments is a little off,the most recent transaction was Sanford Lodge going in net 6.2% closer 7.5% gross slap bit leverage on it say high teens on targeted IRR. the door price was 250 for absolute prime multi family,its an irreplaceable asset.
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/commercialproperty/2012/0912/1224323899023.html
The B of I coco is here makes interesting reading.The strategic decision to flog the family silver is very questionable..why not the AIB stuff first.a ‘mark’ has now been set given the paucity of actual comps. and transactions in this space why sell the best first,what impact on the remaining certainly not par value.
The cloak and dagger nonsense is also troubling,reading the notes this morning there appears to be a prohibition on the issuer buying them pg 11 and the seller pg 21 has veto rights, to know who the buyer is.
given the lack of ‘trust’ in the Govt and the banks specifically why would the govt. not disclose the buyer ?
http://www.bankofireland.com/fs/doc/wysiwyg/Euro%201000000000%2010%20per%20cent%20convertible%20contingent%20capital%20tier%202%20notes%20due%202016%20Prospectus(1).pdf ”
@NWL apologies for hijacking your excellent post.
ASSEZ DE COMMENTAIRE,,,,les irlandais sont des moutons et moi qui croyais qu ils avait du caractére?les banques sont les propriétés de l état;et l état c est le peuple qui souffre;ont jette les irlandais hors de leurs maisons qui ne savent plus remboursés et l état donne des salaires honteux aux directeurs qui sont responsables par leurs manquent de gestion et du gain toujours gagné plus et se foutte du peuple et des conséquences;de toute façon l état ne laissera pas couler la banque et trouvera des solutions au détriment des irlandais;donc pour quoi ne pas en profité??irlandais demandé des comptes au politique étant donné qu ils sont patrons de vos banque;a vous de sanctionnés aux élections;ayez le caractére du rudby ne lachés rien et demandé des comptes aux politique????demandé qu il sanctionne les dirigents des banques par les moyens financiers???moins 50% ils ne peuvent mal d avoir fin avec des salaires de 200000 A 500000 EUR