Just over a week ago, NAMA announced its first bulldozing: a 12-apartment single block on the Gleann Riada estate in Longford is to face the wrecking ball. Apparently there is a protected bird species obstructing the NAMA wrecking ball and it might be some time before the birds are re-housed before NAMA gets to work. Meanwhile 300-400 families in Longford are on the housing waiting list, some for more than five years. Despite the prominent announcement by NAMA of its first demolition, the Agency was tight-lipped about the details of its decision-making. We now have more details.
Yesterday, in the Dail the Sinn Fein finance spokesperson Pearse Doherty asked for details about the demolition. The full exchange is shown at the bottom of this blogpost. This section breaks up the component questions and answers.
Q: if he will provide details of the type of apartments involved
A: two-bedroom duplex units and three-bedroom apartments
Q: the present condition of the property, as well as the condition of the property; when NAMA acquired the underlying loans on the property
A: poorly constructed, had been subject to continuous vandalism and anti-social behaviour, including the removal of all fixtures and fittings
[Note, the Minister implies but does not make clear, the damage was done before NAMA took over the loans. Given NAMA’s previous explanations on a range of subjects, you might be right not to conclude when the damage was done, before or after NAMA took over the loans]
Q: the steps taken by NAMA to protect and maintain the property, including the amount of money spent on the property
A: No answer provided
[The implication from the response to how much has been spent on the property to date indicates that NAMA took no steps involving a financial layout to protect and maintain the property in the last two and half years, since the loans were taken over]
Q: the sales and marketing activity undertaken by NAMA to dispose of the property
A: NAMA advises that the investment required to bring the property to a habitable state and to the point that it could be sold, in the unlikely event that a willing buyer exists, would be such as to make the investment uneconomical and that it is questionable whether structurally such works could in fact be undertaken.
[In other words, no marketing of the property has apparently taken place]
Q: if NAMA considered a sales contract which would oblige the buyer to put the property in a sellable rentable condition;
A: No answer provided
Q: if he will explain the reason the property was not made available for auction
A: No answer provided
Q: the costs NAMA expects to spend on the property in future, including an accounting for the demolition costs
A: NAMA further advises that it has expended no monies to date on the apartment block other than monies incurred in the general remediation and upkeep of the overall development in which it is located; and that it has made a provision of €150,000 for all demolition and remediation works relating to the block
Q: if he will provide details of NAMA’s efforts to make use of the property for social housing in the context of the waiting list of 335 families in Longford
A: the onus is now on housing authorities to determine the suitability of these units for the provision of social housing within their functional areas
[So apparently no effort was made to see if this block might have been used to help house the 300-400 families on the Longford housing list. In fact more effort has been made to rehouse the birds presently lying between the block and the NAMA wrecking ball]
“Deputy Pearse Doherty: To ask the Minister for Finance following the announcement by the National Asset Management Agency of its intention to demolish a block containing 12 apartments in Longford; if he will provide details of the type of apartments involved and the present condition of the property, as well as the condition of the property when NAMA acquired the underlying loans on the property; the steps taken by NAMA to protect and maintain the property, including the amount of money spent on the property; the sales and marketing activity undertaken by NAMA to dispose of the property; if NAMA considered a sales contract which would oblige the buyer to put the property in a sellable rentable condition; if he will explain the reason the property was not made available for auction; the costs NAMA expects to spend on the property in future, including an accounting for the demolition costs; if he will provide details of NAMA’s efforts to make use of the property for social housing in the context of the waiting list of 335 families in Longford..
Minister for Finance, Michael Noonan: I am advised by NAMA that it acquired loans secured on this property in December 2010; that the property, comprising two-bedroom duplex units and three-bedroom apartments, was poorly constructed, had been subject to continuous vandalism and anti-social behaviour, including the removal of all fixtures and fittings; and had become a significant source of concern for neighbouring residents.
I am further advised by NAMA that the property is located on a flood plain and in the middle of an industrial estate. As a result of its condition and location, NAMA advises that the investment required to bring the property to a habitable state and to the point that it could be sold, in the unlikely event that a willing buyer exists, would be such as to make the investment uneconomical and that it is questionable whether structurally such works could in fact be undertaken. In any event, NAMA advises that Longford County Council, in detailing the Category 4 remediation works to be taken as part of the agreed site resolution plan in respect of this development, set out a requirement that the apartment block be demolished.
NAMA has advised me that to undertake the necessary remediation on this development, including the proposed demolition of this block, it had first to take enforcement proceedings over the property, which was a protracted process involving the reinstatement of anIsle of Manholding company. NAMA further advises that it has expended no monies to date on the apartment block other than monies incurred in the general remediation and upkeep of the overall development in which it is located; and that it has made a provision of €150,000 for all demolition and remediation works relating to the block.
NAMA advises that decisions relating to the provision of social housing are a matter for the relevant housing authorities; that it has identified over 3,000 residential units as being available and potentially suitable for social housing and that the onus is now on housing authorities to determine the suitability of these units for the provision of social housing within their functional areas.”
UPDATE: 9th July, 2012. Fianna Fail deputy Robert Troy whose constituency is the setting for Gleann Riada claims that for €150,000 the block which comprises 12 x 2 and 3-bed apartments could be made habitable.
NAMA Wine Lake 
Some excellent content on your site this week. I liked the playboy of the western world analogy.
I wonder did Noonan have second thoughts reading out these replies? Did he stop to think ‘this is f*cking weak’.
One thing I took from his reply is “including the removal of all fixtures and fittings”. I’d assumed this block was probably a shell. If the taps etc. were installed, the building must have been close to completion.
It would be nice to see groups like Threshold or Habitat for Humanity stick their beaks in.
So let me get this right.
The apartment block is located on a flood plain.
The apartment block is also located within the middle of a industrial estate.
So by deduction I take it the industrial estate is also located on a flood plain.
Are they going to demolish the entire industrial estate as well?
Shows up what sort of chimpanzee thinking was going on out in Longford Co Co when planning permission was given years ago?
Needless to say nobody will be held accountable for signing off on these decisions.
Thanks for including the full exchange at the bottom of this post but surely it undermines your own analysis.
They are on a flood plain and “the relevant housing authorities …has identified over 3,000 residential units as being available and potentially suitable for social housing and that the onus is now on housing authorities to determine the suitability of these units for the provision of social housing within their functional areas.”
Why omit the first part of this quote above and why not mention the flood plain in your analysis?
It’s hard to see why these apts would be suitable as social housing. The expense and human cost of dealing with the inevitable flooding is another factor.
@sporthog you are dead right. there are a lot of then councillors nationwide still holding public office that should be hanging their heads in shame but instead seem to have gotten away with it. Of course, one could say the same of the SF party leadership but for different reasons…
@Frank, the empty apartment block may well be on a flood-plain, but then presumably are the 90-odd other homes on the estate, many of which are occupied. So whatever protections are to be put in place for the 90 other homes would presumably be put in place for this apartment block.
@namawinelake, is it reasonable to assume that adequate/any protections will be put in place? I don’t think that is the UK experience. Without further evidence, I stil think outrage at Noonan is misplaced in this instance.
PS. I haven’t really been following this other than dipping into your blog, as I’m away. However, I just watched the Week in Politics on RTE Player on the subject and heard the argument made that putting people in social housing would mean that landlords in receipt of their rent supplement-subsidised tenancy payments might be in trouble with their mortgages. Be that as it may, it’s a poor argument against providing social housing or in favour or demolishing estates.
The fear is that it may be the sort of thing that influences NAMA or govt. thinking. Is it NAMA’s mission to prop up rent and sale prices and subsidise landlords, while the State foots the bill?
Frank, the full argument as to why vacant stock will not solve the social housing waiting list issue is here (TWIP only covered one aspect):
http://irelandafternama.wordpress.com/2012/07/09/can-vacant-housing-solve-the-social-housing-waiting-list/
Basically, a lot of vacant stock is not suitable for social housing and all of it is privately owned by individual, companies, developers or banks – the state either pays rent supplement or social housing leasing initiative, or it has to build/buy it. Moving people from rent supplement to SHLI will not save the state much, if any, money. In cases of receivership, if NAMA gives the property to the state it’ll have cost the state money through NAMA loss, moving people out of buy-to-let into SHLI potentially leads to defaults at state-owned banks. It’s certainly not as straightforward as people would like.
Hi @Rob,
Thanks for your reply. I didn’t mention that it was you that made the point about the lost income for landlords because I didn’t want to shoot the messenger.
I admit I was a bit guilty of oversimplification. It is fair to say that little is as straightforward as people would like when it comes to policy. While some are better than others, all governments (both politicians and civil servants) try to do their best given the advice that they have acquired. The idea, for example, that any government would be more interested in banks than the public (also known as voters) is bonkers. Of course, despite trying to do their best, some appalling decisions have been made. Perhaps sometimes because some advice from vested interest has been given too much credence?
I read your interesting blog. I think that Leo Varadker managed to make one or two of those points.
I think that what you’re implying is that most of the people on the waiting list are in suitable accommodation already and they just need help to afford it. Fair enough.
One would expect ghost estates to be unsuitable for social housing because, in general, they have been built in places where the supply greatly exceeds demand.
That said, any action by the State that does not affect the total supply of housing stock or demand should (on average) not increase the number of property owners in difficulty, although it might change their identity.
Building new social housing would make things worse for property owners in aggregate, while it would be better for other landlords (but not tenants or first-time buyers, etc, who also struggle and are being subsidised), to reduce supply by demolishing stock or keeping it off the market for as long as possible.
I think @namewinelake’s strongest point here is that, unless there are compelling reasons not to, an attempt should be made to sell ghost estates (and as quickly as possible) before choosing to demolish them.
@Frank.Nothing personal from me ever on here and I mean this in the nicest possible way but you should get a pen and paper, make two columns, in one write downall the things that have been cut latley, schools, hospitals wages, stuff like that. In the other coumn write the number 64 billion (check wikipedia for number of zeros). This is the amount gifted to Irish Banks in a bailout of cheap loans( cheaper money than any family will ever get)
Banks versus people is a no brainer for politicians with eh no brains. So I have to disagree with you there.
“Nothing personal from me ever on here and I mean this in the nicest possible way but..”
So you say, @sf ca writer. So you say.
Certainly, the failure to regulate the banks and the disastrous guarantee have been ruinous for the Irish people.
However, no member of the previous government or the opposition parties that supported the guarantee, nor any member of the current government that is managing the aftermath were or are more concerned about the banks than they were about the Irish public.
To think otherwise (as it seems many do) should require special skills in conspiratorial paranoia. The politicians were and are concerned about the banks because of their importance to the functioning of the economy and therefore to the public – who elect them, as I think they might be aware.
Because the recent FF & co govts. had left it so late (due to ignorance), some kind of drastic action was required on the night of the guarantee to prevent a run on Anglo Irish Bank potentially spreading to all Irish banks.
The mistake was not to issue a guarantee of some sort, the mistakes were a) to let it get to that point and b) to issue such a blanket guarantee.