Quarter |
Covering period to |
Delivered to DoF |
Published |
1, 2010 |
31st Mar, 2010 |
30th Jun 2010 |
13th Jul 2010 |
2, 2010 |
30th Jun, 2010 |
30th Sep 2010 |
2nd Nov 2010 |
3, 2010 |
30th Sep, 2010 |
31st Dec 2010 |
2nd Mar 2011 |
4, 2010 |
31st Dec, 2010 |
31st Mar 2011 |
4th May 2011 |
1, 2011 |
31st Mar 2011 |
30th Jun 2011 |
28th Jul 2011 |
2, 2011 |
30th Jun 2011 |
30th Sep 2011 |
Waiting… |
Judging by past experience, it will be about a month before we get to see NAMA’s report and accounts for the second quarter of 2011 ending 30th June, 2011 which were delivered to the Department of Finance a fortnight ago. This entry previews the results.
It’s worth saying at the outset that NAMA is seemingly disposing of an average of €200m of assets per month (at NAMA acquisition values rather than the book value of the loans at the original banks). So between late 2010 and December 2013 it is set to dispose of €7.5bn of assets in total. By “assets” I mean either property or loans – an example of the former would be the sale of 1 King William Street in London (following recovery action against Paddy Shovlin and the Fitzpatrick brothers) and an example of the latter would be the sale of €800m of loans relating to the Maybourne hotel group. By “disposal” I mean a sale or a refinancing.
But think about that for a moment – €200m disposals on average a month every month, representing an average of €500m of original loans (NAMA applied an average 58% discount or “haircut” to loans it acquired from the banks). And although some of these transactions might be huge – NAMA says the €800m Maybourne transaction was its largest transaction to date – most are relatively modest – a €5m office block in Belfast, a €5m shopping centre in Scotland.
Now consider just how much information we have on these disposals. Did NAMA make a profit or loss? How much of the original loan has been written off? What were the professional/adviser fees? How was the asset marketed to ensure prices were maximised? To whom was the asset sold?
When you consider the amount of debate that will take place in the next few months as politicians, the media, the commenteriat and others fret over the €100m disposal of the 25% state shareholding in Aer Lingus, the lack of transparency in NAMA’s reporting is astonishing.
“Ah but NAMA needs to keep its dealings confidential to ensure its business isn’t compromised” might be a defence you sometimes hear; after all, the NAMA chairman Frank Daly has said as much to an Oireachtas committee. But how would the historical reporting of NAMA’s transactions interfere with its future business? It might portray the decision-makers at NAMA as a bunch of amateurs who don’t understand property or economic cycles which might lead to NAMA falling prey to vulturine buyers. More optimistically, it might portray NAMA as a decent asset management company which can deliver on its remit of maximising returns to the taxpayer. But either way, how would revealing basic details of historical deals undermine NAMA’s commercial remit?
An obvious concern is that NAMA is not getting the best price for its assets. Yesterday in Dublin’s High Court, lawyers for developer Jim Mansfield Snr are reported to have expressed concern that Palmerston Stud would be sold by NAMA for less than an offer previously made to the NAMA-appointed receiver. Similar claims were reported to have been made by developer Ray Grehan and I note that Oliver Shah in the UK’s Sunday Times (not available online without subscription) claimed two days ago that NAMA was about to sell the Grehan Crowne Plaza hotel in London for GBP 75m to “a consortium led by Ian Schrager, the New York hotelier credited with inventing the boutique hotel genre”. Senator Mark Daly seems to bob up every so often to make claims about NAMA selling assets back to developers (or people associated with the original developer) for less than the asset was worth. Even the Taoiseach stuck his oar in on the issue a four months ago, though he later curiously declared himself satisfied with NAMA’s operations. All of these claims might be complete tosh, but if NAMA published its list of deals we could at least go some way to disprove the claims eg if the sale price of Palmerston Stud was revealed then Jim Mansfield could then produce the evidence for his claim of a higher offer.
This blog tries to keep track of NAMA disposals reported in the media and elsewhere, but if NAMA has made €4bn of disposals to date, then there is a lot that is not being captured, and those deals that are captured omit a lot of detail.
Anyway, five things to look out for in NAMA’s Q2, 2011 report and accounts:
(1) Disposals. At the NAMA appearance before the Oireachtas Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform hearing last month, the NAMA CEO, Brendan McDonagh claimed that NAMA had notched up €4.5bn of approved disposals and realized much of this in cash. Previous financial reporting from NAMA, including the Q1, 2011 accounts, indicated that completed sales were actually quite modest and there was no indication whatsoever of NAMA’s profit or loss. We should now start to see better numbers with large disposals and an indication of how well NAMA is doing (compared with the agency’s acquisition price as sadly NAMA appears not to be willing to disclose original book values).
(2) Advances to developers. NAMA has said that it has approved €900m of advances to developers of which less than half has been handed over to date. NAMA has also reportedly agreed a €10m loan to Fingal council to help build a road. On the other hand NAMA has redeemed €1.25bn of its bonds which it had given the banks in return for the loans it has acquired. These bonds were costing NAMA the 6-month Euribor rate of 1.7% per annum approximately. If NAMA can generate more than a 1.7% per annum return from advances to developers then it should probably be doing just that, and when NAMA was being conceived it was estimated the agency might have made up to €5bn of advances. It is unlikely the report and accounts will give any great detail on the advances, but you never know.
(3) Gains/losses on derivatives and hedging. Most peoples’ eyes glaze over at these terms but truth be told, NAMA has bought a lot of insurance against interest rate and exchange rate fluctuations, and it will be interesting to see how this insurance is performing.
(4) Profit or loss. The NAMA CEO told an Oireachtas committee hearing last month that he projected an “operating profit” at NAMA in 2011 of €500m. That’s before impairments or write-down in loan values following declines in property. NAMA doesn’t recalculate impairments every quarter, so we should see a healthy operating profit reported for the quarter. The betting on here is that NAMA needs come back to the Government at the end of this year for a recapitalisation because of paper losses incurred on loans as a result of continuing declines in property values. An operating profit would mitigate the risk, but even €500m might not be enough.
(5) The cost of the Paddy McKillen case. Okay NAMA tried to downplay the costs, estimated in the media at €4-7m, of the mammoth case taken by the developer (sorry, “investor”) Paddy McKillen against NAMA in 2010 to prevent his loans being absorbed by the agency. The case was firstly fought inDublin’s High Court where NAMA comprehensively won; Paddy appealed to the Supreme Court where he won on two of the five points at issue, NAMA won on two other points and one wasn’t addressed. Despite the 2-2 draw at the Supreme Court, it seems that NAMA is picking up 100% of the costs.
There will be the usual analysis on here when Minister Noonan deigns to release the report and accounts.
Read Full Post »