After the slap in the face deftly delivered last week by the French, in the form of wringing concessions on corporate tax arrangements out of Ireland as a condition for granting the exact same deal as gifted to Portugal without any condition, you might be forgiven for thinking Ireland might adopt a more cynical approach to recapitalising its busted banks so that those same banks can repay bondholders, many of whom are understood to be French.
For all the talk of billions and billions being shovelled into the banks, in reality just €18.4bn has in fact been paid in cash to the banks so far, comprising €15.4bn paid to the banks directly and a further €3bn in funding promissory notes – the written Dail reply above set out the position in January 2011 and other than the €3bn contribution to the promissory notes in March 2011, there hasn’t been any other State funding activity since. Where is the other €50bn of funding to make up the much vaunted €70bn, I hear you ask? About €28bn is still outstanding in promissory notes and the plan is for the State to stump up €3bn a year in cash to honour these. Much of the remainder is to be shovelled into the banks this week.
You might recall that the original plan under the bailout was to recapitalise the banks in February 2011, and the then-Minister for Finance, the late Brian Lenihan decided that he didn’t have a mandate to effect the recapitalisation in the middle of a general election, and left the task to the new administration (though he did offer at the time to complete the task early if the leaders of Labour and Fine Gael wrote to him in those terms, which they didn’t). And upon assuming power, Labour and Fine Gael pointed to their election promise to wait until the end of March 2011 when the stress test results were to be published, before recapitalising the banks. On 31st March 2011, the “mother of all stress tests” indicated that our banks needed another €24bn (including buffers) so as to reach a standard of capital which represented 10% of the assets of the banks. And then Minister Noonan considered the €24bn cost, and the plans to extract a contribution from subordinated bondholders and he decided to wait until the end of July 2011 before injecting €24bn (less the subordinated bondholder contribution) into the banks. After this morning’s Bank of Ireland announcement it now looks like the banks need approximately €18bn of capital rather than €24bn. And according to yesterday’s Sunday Business Post “a spokesman for the Department of Finance and the National Treasury Management Agency confirmed that the transfer of funds would take place in the coming days.”
When the Minister shovels another €18bn into the banks, he crosses a Rubicon because that €18bn represents real sovereign funding which will inextricably tie sovereign debt to bank debt. Here are six reasons why the Minister for Finance should hold on to his cheque book for the time being:
(1) He doesn’t have to recapitalise the banks now. The original Memorandum of Understanding with the IMF/EU stipulated that the recapitalisation was to have taken place in February 2011 but that was seemingly waived. Following the announcement of the March 2011 stress test results, an intention was signalled to recapitalise by the end of July 2011. Certainly the IMF, EU and ECB want Ireland to recapitalise by the end of July 2011, as was clearly urged at the conclusion of the recent review mission. But the IMF and EU will not be back for the next review until October 2011. And although the ECB use their provision of non-standard liquidity as a stick, the ECB has committed to maintaining that liquidity to October. So as long as the recapitalisation takes place before October, what would be the consequence of a further deferral now? Might an act of defiance with low-value negative consequences signal a more confident stance on negotiating other obstacles, for example the burning of senior unguaranteed unsecured bondholders at Anglo and INBS?
(2) Bondholders inLondon andNew York are praying that the Minister recapitalises now. Because without the recapitalisation, our covered banks are effectively insolvent. A case can be made for Bank of Ireland, but truth be told, without the State guarantee, even that bank would become illiquid rapidly and consequently would become insolvent after a fire sale liquidation of assets to secure alternate liquidity. When this €18bn is shovelled into the banks, the banks will be solvent and the claim for 100% repayment by bondholders will move up to a whole new level. Not recapitalising now, strengthens the Minister’s hand in any future negotiations.
(3) As part of the banking restructuring announced in March 2011, an intention was signalled that Irish banks would undergo significant deleveraging. A long-held concern on here is that deleveraging would mean that new lending inIreland contracted, in much the same way as the 2000s saw an expansion of lending enabled by bondholders lending colossal sums to Irish banks. And in the 2000s that bubble of credit led to economic expansion and inflation. The concern is that deleveraging will have the opposite impact. Recently questions were put to the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) and the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) asking how their economic forecasting models would account for the announced deleveraging. The CBI did not respond but the ESRI did respond to say that it has not yet forecast the economic outlook taking account of deleveraging but its next forecast using its HERMES model would. It is worrying that Ireland may not at this point have examined the impact of deleveraging €70bn of assets from its banks – some will be foreign held but the domestic dimension of deleveraging is likely to contract lending and money supply and economic activity.
(4) The two “pillar bank” strategy is nonsensical. With a post office and credit union network together with local branches of foreign banks, Ireland can manage with one pillar bank, possibly supplemented by a competition oversight department in the Central Bank/Financial Regulator. The detailed arguments are set out here.
(5) Ireland’s banks are not lending. Mortgage and other lending statistics from the Central Bank of Ireland confirm that lending is contracting. From home buyers trying to get a mortgage to small businesses trying to get finance, the message appears to be that the banks are not lending. Even the State-operated Credit Review Office seems now to be accepting that lending constraints are at the banks rather than in demand from businesses. One of the pre-election promises to make it into the Programme for Government was the creation of an investment bank which might start with a clean slate and provide lending to businesses untainted with the need to rebuild a tattered balance sheet. Will the €18bn being shovelled into the banks this week improve access to credit? Difficult to say and it will be difficult to untangle future behaviour but it seems from this perspective that a new investment bank starting with a clean slate might be a better proposition.
(6) Despite protestations to the contrary by the NTMA and the Department of Finance, the economic environment has deteriorated since the stress tests were conducted in March 2011 (or indeed January 2011 when the stress test parameters were set). Last week’s EU crisis summit is unlikely to be the last this summer and now that the smoke is clearing after the hoopla last Thursday the cold reality of funding the EFSF and the remaining debt issues in Greece and elsewhere have to be tackled. A 20% reduction in Greece’s debt will not transform the prospects of that country. A Spanish bank needing €6bn of capital and liquidity funding on Friday last is unlikely to be the only Spanish casualty this summer. Domestically, the evidence points to commercial and residential property declines being more significant than expected. And the buffers built into the stress tests are not as significant as the NTMA or the Department of Finance would have you believe. So before shovelling another €18bn of our funds into the banks, why not validate the March 2011 results using the experience of the last four months. Might we need another €10bn for the banks? And if we do, might that change our position on maintaining two pillar banks or our negotiation stance on senior bondholders?