Last Thursday’s announcements aimed at restoring confidence in Ireland’s finances by providing clarity, finality and certainty contained a few paradoxes – the jiggery pokery of increasing NAMA loan limits from €5m to €20m at AIB and BoI was examined here yesterday and the upshot would point to the change being aimed purely at keeping BoI out of majority State ownership. Another paradox was contained in the “accelerated” programme for transferring Anglo’s loans (in particular) to NAMA. According to Minister for Finance Brian Lenihan’s statement : “In order to support the accelerated implementation of the plan for restructuring Anglo into an Asset Recovery Bank and a Funding Bank, the Board have agreed that Anglo’s remaining eligible bank assets will be transferred to NAMA by the end of October and that bonds will issue to Anglo in return on the basis of NAMA’s current estimate of their value. These loans will then be subject to due diligence and valued by NAMA on a loan by loan basis. If any adjustment to their value is necessary, it will be made subsequently. The EU has been advised of this revision to the valuation process for the remaining Anglo loans and I will be making Regulations to provide for it.”
David Clerkin in yesterday’s Sunday Business Post adds a little detail to the revised arrangements and claims that €6bn of Anglo’s €19bn remaining NAMA-bound loans will transfer without any due diligence (no mention is made of valuation, though in Tranche 1 there was a dispute involving 25% of the loans transferred where the banks’ valuers were at odds with NAMA’s valuers).
Now the Minister said the “EU has been advised” and the EC Competition Commissioner Joaquin Almunia issued a statement following the Minister’s statement in which he said “regarding NAMA, the announced changes to the way it manages loans are in line with the Commission’s approval of the NAMA scheme”. Let’s look at the approval. The EU Decision approving the NAMA scheme was issued on 26th February, 2010. The Decision sets out the EC’s understanding of the NAMA scheme and approves it. The procedure approved by the EC for transferring loans from the Participating Institutions (PIs – AIB, Anglo, BoI, EBS and INBS) is set out by the EC in paragraphs 46 – 70. Paragraph 56 is probably most relevant to the issue.
“Whilst it is expected that all the properties securing the eligible bank assets will be independently valued, given the high number of loans, the market valuation process will be performed in two steps.
i. Firstly, each participating institution will provide NAMA with the required data for the top 100 borrower relationship credit positions. NAMA will then determine from these the top 150 borrower relationship credit positions by size of exposure across all participating institutions. The underlying collaterals relating to these top 15019 borrower relationship credit positions will form the “core underlying assets”, for which the valuers will provide Collateral CMVs. The data then collected would form a statistical basis for determining the Collateral CMVs of the remaining underlying assets (the “non-core underlying assets”). The statistical basis would be applied to establish an initial Collateral CMV of the non-core underlying assets, based on which an initial transfer price will be determined;
ii. Secondly, the valuers will prepare valuation reports for the non-core underlying assets over the next 12 months (i.e. post transfer of assets to NAMA in certain circumstances) in order to determine a final Collateral CMV of the non-core underlying assets. Any settlement amount (deriving from any difference between the initial Collateral CMV and the final Collateral CMV of the noncore underlying assets) will be clawed back by NAMA.”
The above paragraph didn’t prompt concern when first made public on 9th April, 2010. But remember at that point, NAMA had told the EU that it expected average discounts of 30%. Since February 2010 the condition of the loans at the PIs has been exposed in horrible detail and we have seen NAMA discount INBS’s loans by 72.4% in Tranche 2 and indeed we know that a significant volume of loans has been transferred for zero consideration. Crucially however, there has been an increase in haircuts between Tranche 1 and 2, and the forecast for the remaining tranches shows a further significant rise in haircuts (the extreme is the 58% relative increase in EBS’s haircut from a weighted average of 38% in Tranches 1 and 2 to 60% in the remaining tranche). So how reliable is the data collected from Tranches 1 and 2? How indicative is that data of the haircuts to apply in the final tranches?
It seems to me that the EU approval was granted in the context of much lower haircuts and before the full horror of the banks’ processes and documentation was exposed. And I think the EU approval was predicated on the assumption that a reasonable estimate of remaining valuations could be produced from an examination of the top 150 borrowers. And after the experience of Tranches 1 and 2 and the forecast final haircuts, I don’t think that is a safe assumption at all.
The problem is that the Minister for Finance is seeking to put a final cost on the bailing out of the banks as quickly as possible. But simply moving volatile loans whose values are unknown and nigh impossible to infer from Tranches 1 and 2 is only going to move the black box from Anglo to NAMA, and the market will understand that there is substantial risk associated with the black box. Not only that, what is being proposed now cannot support the NAMA principle of cleansing banks of a toxic class of loan asset and replacing the asset with certain-value security if in the next 12 months NAMA may claw back additional and substantial sums from the banks.